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The turn in economics: neoclassical
dominance to mainstream pluralism?1
JOHN B. DAVIS
University of Amsterdam and Marquette University
Abstract: This paper investigates whether since the 1980s neoclassical economics
has been in the process of being supplanted as the dominant research programme
in economics by a collection of competing research approaches which share
relatively little in common with each other or with neoclassical economics. A
shortlist of the new approaches in recent economics includes game theory,
experimental economics, behavioral economics, evolutionary economics,
neuroeconomics, and non-linear complexity theory. Two hypotheses are
advanced – one regarding the relation between economics instruction and
economics research and one regarding the nature of the economics research
frontier – to describe social-institutional practices that contribute to the
replication of economics as a field. Two further hypotheses are advanced – one
regarding the boundaries of the field and one regarding how the field appraises
itself – to create a historical–methodological framework for evaluating the
question of change in economics and change in recent economics in particular.
Finally, the paper distinguishes three leading explanations – the ‘breakdown’
view, the ‘takeover’ view, and the ‘maturity’ view – of why neoclassical economics
no longer dominates a mainstream economics.
1. Introduction
This paper investigates whether neoclassical economics may be in the process
of being supplanted as the dominant research programme in recent economics
by a collection of new, largely non-overlapping, competing research economics
programmes that share relatively little in common either with each other or with
neoclassical economics. I treat this new more diverse economics as a stage in the
development of economics at the last century’s end, provisionally label it ‘recent
economics’, and date its beginnings to roughly around 1980. A shortlist of the
new research programmes in economics that began to emergemore or less around
this date would include game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary
1 I am grateful for comments on previous versions of this paper to Jack Amariglio, Mark Blaug,
David Colander, Wade Hands, Matthias Klaes, Philip Mirowski, Jorma Sappinen, Esther-Mirjam Sent,
Roy Weintraub, James Wible, and the reviewers of this journal. The usual disclaimer applies.
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economics, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and non-linear complexity
economics. All involve significant departures from the neoclassical economics as
generally understood (though there are elements of continuity as well), and all are
especially associated with the ambiguity increasingly surrounding the meaning
of the term ‘mainstream economics’. Another way of putting the concerns of
this paper is to ask, following David Colander (2000), whether not only is the
term ‘neoclassical economics’ dead as a characterization of current mainstream
economics, but whether it is dead as a characterization of how mainstream
economics is currently evolving. Needless to say, any investigation of change that
is on going must be speculative in nature. Four caveats of the current discussion
consequently need to be stated at the outset.
First, the paper does not attempt to settle the issue of whether recent economics
has in fact undergone such a change on the grounds that preliminary to doing so
it seems necessary to address and clarify a number of interpretive issues central
to explaining the process of change in economics and in recent economics in
particular. It should be added that the question of change in any science or system
of ideas is an extremely complicated one, and that historians and philosophers
of science are hardly in agreement over what constitute criteria for identifying
change. Thus it would be naı¨ve – to say the least – to suppose that simple
measures of change are readily available to decide this issue or like ones for
other periods in the history of economics. The paper does, however, attempt to
begin to make the case that there has been a turn in economics, and elaborates
a number of hypotheses in support of this conclusion.
Second, the paper also does not operate from the perspective of any of
the standard methodological frameworks regarding change in paradigms and
research programmes, nor does the paper approach the issue of change from any
particular rules-based perspective. Rather it attempts to state a set of resolvable
claims about possible change in recent economics based on an assessment of its
current social-institutional structure and relation to other disciplines. The paper
thus relies on what may be termed an historical–methodological approach that
uses historical analysis to generate methodological judgments, and then employs
methodological thinking to carry out that historical analysis. In this respect it
resembles to a degree the explicitly sociological analysis of Colander, Holt, and
Rosser (2004), but it also differs from their analysis in its greater emphasis on
a specific historical–methodological issue: namely, the boundaries of economics
as a field and its relation to other fields.
Third, as noted, the paper does not treat change in economics as only involving
a change in ideas, though that type of change is the ultimate focus. Rather the
paper proceeds by examining economics as a set of social-institutional practices,
and then, when referring to what has changed in economics, focuses on changes
in what I broadly refer to as its ‘content’. It is important to give greater attention
to economics’ social-institutional practices than I do here, but space constraints
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make the primary object of this paper a discussion of how thinking in recent
economics has changed from how it has widely been perceived.2
Fourth, though it is reasonable to expect that a paper investigating issues
of change in economics begin by defining ‘neoclassical’ and ‘mainstream’
economics, that task is not undertaken here on the assumption that a discussion
of differences over what the former includes, as well as discussion of clear
continuities between the former and the latter, do not affect broad differences
between neoclassical economics and the recent new approaches. Colander
(2000) makes a concise case to this effect; Mirowski (2002) makes a more
extended historical argument for the same conclusion. However, it is also
straightforward to note that attention to such things as strategic interaction
(game theory), the psychological characteristics of human beings (behavioral
economics), experimental practices, the arguments of evolutionary psychology,
non-linearmethods, etc., all constitute strategies of investigation that were largely
absent in standard competitive marginalist thinking, which has been themainstay
of neoclassicism for many years.
Apart from these caveats, I should also emphasize the potential significance
of the argument of this paper for readers of this journal. Evolutionary and
institutional themes have been primarily associated with heterodox economics
during the period of neoclassical dominance, but there is good reason to think
they may be emerging as central themes in recent mainstream economics.
For example, one important dimension of behavioral economics is that
it reverses a century-long history in neoclassical economics in which the
psychological characteristics of individuals were increasingly de-emphasized.
However, the behavioral economics heuristics and biases program associated
with the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky re-introduces many
of the same concepts, if in different form, long associated with the emphasis
on habits in institutional economics. Relatedly, Vernon Smith, responding to
experimental results regarding reciprocity, has asserted that a first principle of
recent economics in his environment–institutions–behavior framework is that
‘institutions matter’ (Smith, 1989). Also, clearly the re-emergence of evolutionary
economics recalls the Veblenian tradition. And arguably various versions of
complexity economics, though sometimes highly formal, rely on many of the
same basic themes found in evolutionary and institutional economics. I comment
briefly on what these convergences may imply for economics in the future in the
conclusion.
2 Important social-institutional practices for economics, in addition to those discussed in the next
section, include the funding of research, the rise of laboratories, research assessment strategies, changes
in advanced instruction, the ‘Americanization’ of economics, etc. See Mirowski and Sent (2001) for fuller
treatment of the economics of science in general.
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The first section of the paper begins by discussing the nature of the process
of change in recent economics, and advances two hypotheses – one regarding
the relation between economics instruction and economics research and one
regarding the economics research frontier – to describe social-institutional
practices contributing to the replication of economics as a field. The second
section outlines a historical–methodological framework for evaluating the
question of change in economics, and then applies this framework to change
in recent economics. Two further hypotheses – one regarding the boundaries
of the field and one regarding how the field appraises itself – are advanced to
explain the process of change in recent economics. The third section of the paper
considers three leading explanations – the ‘breakdown’ view, the ‘takeover’ view,
and the ‘maturity’ view – of why neoclassical economics no longer dominates a
mainstream economics increasingly made up of a collection of different research
programmeswith neoclassicism playing a somewhat subordinate role. The fourth
section concludes, and comments briefly on whether there might be future
convergence around a new dominant approach in economics.
2. Social-institutional practices and the process of change in economics
On the surface the thesis that neoclassicism has lost or is losing its dominance
within the field of economics is paradoxical, since neoclassicism remains solidly
embedded in economics instruction, indeed arguably more so today than was
the case even a short number of years ago. How can neoclassical economics
no longer constitute the main approach in the field if it constitutes the main
approach in economics instruction? This question raises the larger issue of the
nature of the process of change in economics and the social-institutional practices
that underlie it. Here I focus on this process of change in terms of the relationship
between the two main practices that contribute to replication of the field over
time, economics instruction and economics research, characterize the latter in
terms of a research frontier, and advance two hypotheses about the nature of
this process of change in recent economics.
Economics instruction and economics research
I take economics instruction and economics research to be the twomain practices
responsible for the replication of economics over time. How are they related?
I hypothesize that over much of its history, but particularly in the period of
postwar economics in which the field has become more highly professionalized,
the direction of causation for change in economics has been from research
to instruction, with content of instruction generally emerging with a lag as
a summary or set of summaries of earlier research that has gained general
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acceptance.3 That is, changes in economics research generally precede, and
ultimately generate changes in economics instruction, and not the reverse. This
implies that during periods of change in the direction or content of economics as
a whole, there are generally not only differences between economics instruction
and economics research, but these differences may be greater the faster the rate of
innovation in research. Of course, much that occurs in research is unsuccessful,
while some successful research never gains a foothold in instruction, so the
content of research at any one time does not predict well what future instruction
will involve. The point rather is that when there are differences between the
economics research and instruction – at least significant differences – a change
in direction in economics research is likely to signal future change in economics
instruction.4 Thus it is not paradoxical to say that neoclassicism is no longer
dominant in economics as a whole, although it still constitutes the main course
of instruction, if neoclassical economics no longer dominates economic research.
Indeed, it is possible that, were non-neoclassical economics research particularly
rapid and/or involved a number of significantly divergent new directions, there
might even be a short-term increase in consensus over neoclassical instruction on
account of the difficulties associated with establishing consensus over the value
of new research, and then translating this new research into new instruction.
The research frontier
This view of economics research and instruction naturally raises the question as
to what the main incubators for new economics research are. A model that seems
appropriate to the postwar professionalization of economics as an academic
discipline is a vintage or cohort model that focuses on waves of new doctoral
degrees in the field on the grounds that on average new initiatives in research tend
to be made at the outset of individuals’ research careers, with generally modest
changes in direction emerging over the balance of their research careers. That
is, a vintage or cohort approach explains the change in research in terms of the
idea of a moving research frontier (or set of frontiers). A change in the character
of a research frontier would accordingly be said to occur when a significantly
large number of qualitatively new doctoral initiatives occur in a relatively short
period of time (cf. Colander, Holt, and Rosser, 2004). For example, if – as
3 This same argument is made in Colander, Holt, and Rosser (2004) and Colander (2005). Note that,
while this thesis is obvious to many, there have been traditions in economics, for example at Cambridge
in the first half of the last century, in which instruction played a more commanding role, and arguably
had a significant influence on research. Contemporary science culture generally has research in the lead
for reasons that have been investigated in recent economics of science.
4 As pointed out by one reviewer for this journal, as well as others at presentations of this paper, there
are a number of anomalies associated with this transmission process, including contents that persist in
instruction, despite changes in the content of research, uneven transmission across levels of instruction
(advanced, intermediate, and introductory), appearance of instructional contents unrelated to changes in
research, etc.
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seems to be the case – doctoral research using game theory is relatively rare
before 1980, and constitutes a significant share of doctoral research after 1980,
then one might then conclude that a new research frontier has emerged. A test
of this sort of change in the economics research frontier would then involve
surveying changing shares of different identifiable research orientations in new
doctoral degrees over distinct time periods, particularly in leading doctoral-
granting institutions, assuming, as seems reasonable, that these institutions tend
to disproportionately influence change in research directions.5
A corollary of the research frontier hypothesis concerns the survival of older
vintage ideas inside the research frontier. If research cohorts tend to maintain
attachment to their original research initiatives, then a succession of research
cohorts, which together fill out the overall research community, might be
represented as an ordered array of waves of ideas and approaches, with the
earliest waves at any one time being occupied by the oldest active researchers.
This simplified model implies that attachment to earlier research initiatives
generally decreases as the earlier waves lose active researchers to retirement.
While earlier research approaches sustain a presence in the overall research
community when there is significant change on the research frontier, barring
new cohorts renewing these earlier initiatives, continued change on the research
frontier implies that earlier approaches occupy a decreasing place in the overall
research community over time. Yet until this process of change on the research
frontier has gone on for some period of time, the bulk of research reflects
what is behind the research frontier. Thus, not only is neoclassicism dominating
economics instruction compatible with its being replaced by new approaches in
economics, but its eventual replacement as a dominant approach is compatible
with the bulk of economics research continuing to be neoclassical for some
considerable period of time.
3. A framework for investigating change in recent economics
Here I outline an historical–methodological framework for investigating possible
change in recent economics by characterizing the field, first, in terms of its
boundaries with other fields, and, second, in terms of the field’s reflexive, self-
appraisal as carried out primarily in the sub-fields of economic methodology and
history of economics.
The boundaries and nature of economics
Though I have spoken of economics as a field, it clearly should not be assumed
that the nature and definition of economics as a field is fixed and unchanging,
5 Particularly important in this model is the role of the most prestigious doctoral programs. Thus on
average their lead in new areas of research is followed by second tier programs, third tier programs follow
second tier programs, etc. This also represents a broad simplification, and arguments can be made that
innovation occurs below the top tier institutions.
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particularly when the content of the field itself is changing. For example, it is
not clear that the traditional definition of economics in terms of the allocation
of scarce resources fits very well with evolutionary or complexity economics. I
thus try to simplify this issue by rather focusing on change at the boundaries
of economics in terms of engagements with other disciplines, thus putting aside
questions regarding the nature and definition of the field. More specifically, I
focus on the expansion or contraction of the boundaries of economics in terms
of the idea of export and import of conceptual contents across those boundaries
to and from other disciplines. The boundaries of economics can then be said to
expand with the export of its contents to other fields – a phenomenon popularly
known as economics imperialism –while those boundaries can be said to contract
with the import of contents from other fields – a phenomenon that has been
associated with the idea of a ‘reverse imperialism’ (Frey and Benz, 2005).
Economics imperialism is often associated with the Chicago School, the
Public Choice School, and more generally the application of neoclassical
market concepts to non-market domains of social life, but it is also associated
with the general adoption of rational choice analysis, market metaphors,
and the quantitative methods of economics in a variety of non-economic
fields of investigation (cf. Grossbard-Schechtman and Clague, 2002). How are
we to explain cross-boundary transfers of science contents between fields?
The ‘imperialism’ idea can be misleading, because it implies an unwelcome
imposition, whereas the receiving field may be selectively appropriating non-
traditional contents for reasons specific to its own development. In contrast,
the export idea, as half of an export/import combination, is more neutral, and
also points us toward a possible comparative assessment of fields in terms
of their respective degrees of content homogeneity reflecting the degree of
dominance of a field by one approach. That is, whereas fields with high levels
of imported contents may be said to be comparatively heterogeneous or at least
less homogeneous than fields with low levels of imported contents, so conversely
fields with high levels of exported contents might be thought to be relatively
homogeneous. On this view, economics imperialism as an export process can
be said to be indicative of high levels of consensus among economists regarding
preferred methods, concepts, and theories, and thus dominance of the field by a
preferred approach. This is not to say that important internal differences in a field
are absent in a period of imperialism, but only that, as a field with high levels of
exported contents relative to other fields with high levels of imported contents,
economics was relatively more homogeneous and dominated by neoclassicism at
the height of its economics imperialism phase.6
6 This view of field homogeneity may be more characteristic of economics than other fields. Hausman’s
argument that economics is a relatively ‘separate’ science gives grounds for thinking that it is especially
characteristic of economics (Hausman, 1992).
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Using the neoclassicism of the Chicago School and in particular Gary Becker’s
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior as emblematic of 1970s economics
imperialism,7 this period might be regarded as the zenith of economics’ relatively
homogeneous organization under the neoclassical approach. But the 1970s
was also the decade in which the neoclassicism’s general equilibrium theory
framework was beginning to be seriously questioned by many of its main
proponents in what has come to be known as the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu
results (Kirman, 1989). Indeed, though there had been earlier criticisms of
neoclassicism, the disenchantment with the general equilibrium framework in
this instance was so severe as to lead a number of the theory’s leading proponents
to recommend that the neoclassical approach be abandoned altogether in favor of
explaining economic behavior in game theoretic terms (e.g., Sonnenschein, 1985;
also cf. Rizvi, 1994) – a recommendation which indeed was widely adopted
in economics research and doctoral instruction beginning in the 1980s with
the emergence of game theory as an increasingly key microeconomic method.
Game theory, however, is made up of a set of contents that was imported
into economics from mathematics (Mirowski, 2002). Thus the rise of game
theory in economics appears to signal a point when economics imperialism was
increasingly matched if not supplanted by a ‘reverse imperialism’, or a point
when content imports rather than content exports increasingly defined the field.
On the view here, then, economics became less homogeneous and therefore less
dominated by neoclassicism as it made greater use of game theory, such that
effectively the boundaries of what had been traditionally seen as economics
contracted and shifted inward. This view is only reinforced by the fact that
other new economics research programmes – experimentalism and behaviorism –
were also emerging at this time, and also depended heavily upon imported
contents – experimentalism from many locations in science and behavioralism
from psychology. Thus we might rather say that the overall shift in the field’s
contents in this period signaled an end to neoclassical dominance and the early
emergence of a more pluralistic mainstream economics.
A changing balance of content exports and imports and boundary expansions
and contractions, however, is hardly unique to recent economics, as the earlier
example of an interwar pluralism followed by postwar neoclassicism attests
(Morgan and Rutherford, 1998). We might accordingly take as an initial
hypothesis for the framework advanced here that fields tend to go through
recurring though non-regular cycles in which particular approaches are dominant
in certain periods, followed by periods in which there is competition between
different approaches. This cycle hypothesis of an alternating unity and plurality
in the history of economics or any field, however, faces a serious challenge.
How are we to distinguish between competition within a relatively unified
7 Note Becker’s self-confident expression of the imperialism idea: ‘the economic approach is a
comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior’ (Becker, 1976: 8).
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approach in a field and competition in a genuinely pluralistic environment
involving significantly different approaches to that field? The answer to this
question, and thus the grounds for saying that a cycle view has at least some
plausibility, it seems, lies in whether we are able to advance a satisfactory
criterion for saying when apparently different approaches are indeed genuinely
different approaches. Here, I suggest, the content export/import logic may be
especially helpful. When competing approaches import contents from distinct
outside sources, they may be said to constitute genuinely different approaches
in virtue of the different conceptual and theoretical foundations of different
fields. That is, on the assumption that different fields are themselves distinct
in virtue of having different conceptual and theoretical foundations, cross-
boundary content transfers juxtapose different foundations within single fields,
thus setting up genuine competition between approaches. The ‘cycle hypothesis’,
that is, ultimately depends on whether the ‘different foundations’ assumption
can be reasonably said to apply.
By this criterion, moreover, the competing approaches in recent economics
are indeed genuinely different approaches since they each originate from sources
outside economics: game theory arose out of mathematics originally via John
von Neumann and was subsequently developed in its classical phase by Robert
Aumann and Reinhard Selten; experimental economics draws on a long history
of experimental practice in natural and physical science almost entirely absent
from economics; evolutionary economics reflects Darwinian biology (despite
Classical/Malthusian economics and Schumpeterian antecedents); behavioral
economics receives its impetus from recent psychology; and complexity
economics arises out of computer and mathematical methods applied in many
natural and social sciences well in advance of their recent appearance in
economics. Were we consequently to demonstrate that these approaches jointly
occupy a significant share of the recent economics research frontier, say, in
terms of successive recent doctoral cohorts, a process of replacing neoclassical
dominance in economics by a more pluralistic mainstream economics could
be said to be in motion with different research approaches and their different
foundational commitments competing with one another within the field.8
But this conclusion might still be challenged were it to be argued that there is
selection bias in the import/appropriation process by which recent economics has
drawn content from other fields. Were imports only to occur which were broadly
consistent with the neoclassical approach, an argument could be made that the
new environment is less pluralistic than the distinct sources of these imports seem
to suggest.9 Indeed one reason to think that current mainstream economics is
8 One commentator on this paper suggested that changing in-field and out-of-field citation practices
might provide a basis on which the influence of other disciplines on economics could be assessed. But
influence transmitted in ideas is not reliably captured by citation patterns for a variety of reasons.
9 This issue is particular relevant to behavioral economics in that a number of leading researchers
have argued behavioral economics is not inconsistent with neoclassical economics (e.g., Camerer and
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not especially pluralistic is the continuing divide between mainstream economics
and heterodox economics. From this vantage point, it could be argued that
change within the mainstream has involved a selective appropriation process
that systematically excludes certain types of heterodox contents (Davis, 2006).
However, if for the moment we leave this divide in place, and consider the
development of mainstream economics by itself, it can also be argued that
selection bias has not been a significant factor within the development of the
mainstream. A case to this effect has been made by Colander, alluded to at the
outset, who identifies a set of six principles he sees as central to neoclassicism,
and argues to be absent from new approaches in recent economics (Colander,
2000).
Thus at one and the same time selection bias both appears to exist (with respect
to heterodox economics approaches) and be absent (in Colander’s argument).
How are we, then, to address its weight and significance? We might begin by
noting that, even were selection bias to exist in important degree, it would still
be an open question as to the extent to which it could be said to domesticate
different types of content imports. Thus what is needed is some way of assessing
the balance arrived at in recent economics between accommodating selection and
truly outside content, in order to determine whether or not selection bias has
been sufficient to overcome the pluralist impulses in recent economics. I suggest a
simple ‘intelligibility test’ for this purpose, and demonstrate this test by example
as follows.Whereas for neoclassicism in the 1970s individuals trained in different
sub-fields in economics (labor, trade, etc.) were generally able to understand one
another’s research on account of shared marginalist principles and methods, in
recent economics it appears increasingly rare for individuals trained in different
research approaches (e.g., game theory versus non-linear complexity theory) to
understand one another’s research. If this is so, then we might say that in recent
mainstream economics, though selection bias is no doubt present in some degree,
it does not seem sufficient to overcome the pluralist tendencies in the field at the
current time.
This may of course change in the future were different research approaches in
recent economics to begin to converge. On the argument here, this could occur
were different approaches to converge on specific foundational issues imported
along with content from their respective origin fields. For example, though
originally game theorists and experimental economists were largely at odds over
the role of deduction and experiment in economics, these differences appear to
be narrowing, as economists are now increasingly engaged in experimentally
testing game theory predictions (e.g., Camerer, 2003). A ‘cycle hypothesis’ of
an alternating unity and plurality in the history of economics or any field, then,
would include both divergence and convergence stages, where the former creates
Loewenstein, 2003), while, at the same time, other researchers have argued the opposite (e.g., Cubitt,
Starmer, and Sugden, 2001).
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conditions in which a new dominant approachmay possibly emerge, and involves
an increasing effort to reduce differences over foundational content, perhaps also
accompanied by a period of a reduced rate of borrowing from outside fields. But
again, it is important to emphasize that this is only an hypothesis subject to
further investigation.
Economics’ self-appraisal in economic methodology and history of economics
There are a variety of ways in which fields and the individuals in them
reflexively engage in a process of self-appraisal. The sub-fields of economic
methodology and the history of economics themselves constitute reflexive
practices in economics in that their object of investigation is economics as a field,
whereas the object of investigation of economics itself is economic life, or in the
case of the other sub-fields of economics some domain of economic life. That
economic methodology and the history of economics are particularly important
among reflexive practices in economics is evident from their institutionalized
recognition as sub-fields and their accordingly systematic character.10 What I
discuss here, then, is how cyclical shifts in the boundaries of economics over
time may be thought to affect the relationship of the field of economics as a
whole to these two sub-fields or at least the reflexive practices they involve. In
connection with the change in recent economics in particular, I attempt to say
how these sub-fields may change in status and in their relation to economics as
a whole, should it be that economics is moving from neoclassical dominance to
mainstream pluralism. First, then, what is the status of these fields in the period
in which neoclassical economics has been dominant?
By most accounts, the status of economic methodology and the history of
economics as sub-fields in economics over the last several decades is believed to
be a declining one (Weintraub, 2002). Though by some measures the two sub-
fields have prospered as independently professionalized sub-fields (Davis, 2002,
2003), interest in and attention to them on the part of practitioners generally and
in the field as a whole appears to have steadily declined. Indeed, over the last two
decades most economics doctoral programs have eliminated instruction in the
history and methodology of economics. Further evidence of the declining status
of history of economics might be established by evaluating citation patterns
to determine the extent to which research in the sub-fields is decreasingly cited
outside of the two sub-fields, as compared with the experience of other sub-fields.
Another relevant measure would be the extent to which economic methodology
and history of economics research has become increasingly concentrated among
individuals for whom it is their primary subject of research. But assuming there
10 Of course practitioners also evaluate their field in a reflexive manner since they judge how results
of research reflect research questions current in the field. While this focus brings certain advantages
associated with close contact with research problems, it also tends to bracket out larger reflexive issues
associated with the nature and status of the field over time.
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has been a decline in status of the two sub-fields, how might this development
be explained in terms neoclassical dominance of economics?
Taking economic methodology and the history of economics to be the primary
reflexive practices in economics implies that the decline in the status of these fields
is tantamount to a decline in the field’s involvement in self-examination and self-
appraisal. A reasonable hypothesis explaining why a period of dominance by
one approach might produce such an outcome is that in periods dominated
by particular approaches a lower value is placed on self-examination and self-
appraisal on account of the absence of competition from other approaches. The
rationale is straightforward: because the field is largely perceived to be identical
to the dominant approach to it, the issue of there even being a relation between it
as an approach and the field as a whole does not easily arise. A test of this thesis
would be whether a survey of neoclassical economists produced a consensus
view that neoclassical economics is essentially identical with economics
per se. In contrast, in periods when there are competing approaches to the
field, proponents of these different approaches could be expected to place a
higher value on economic methodology and the history of economics, because,
unlike what occurs when one approach is dominant, positioning one’s approach
relative to another depends upon stating one’s relation to the field as a whole
in a relatively convincing manner. This can be understood to be primarily a
matter of the strategy appropriate in a more competitive environment, but it
can also be understood to be a matter of how practitioners from different
research approaches with origins in other fields attempt to sort out conflict
over foundational issues. A possible test in this regard would be to determine
whether self-identified, mainstream economists are active in justifying the value
of their research approaches in terms external to those approaches, such as
might be addressed in terms of arguments from the methodology and history of
economics.
All of this does not imply, however, that economic methodology and the
history of economics as professionalized sub-fields per se need necessarily gain
in status in a period of a more pluralistic economics. In an environment of
competing research programmes, methodology and history arguments might
well arise indigenously, as it were, among practitioners who are willing to make
use of such arguments, but might not be prepared or interested in engaging
the relevant professional literatures in depth. One example in this regard is
the experimentalist, Vernon Smith, who, in contesting the deeply entrenched
deductivist tradition in economics in an effort to justify empirical methods in
economics research, has made explicit use of the Duhem–Quine methodology
principle, though without paying heed to the extensive methodology literature on
the subject (Smith, 1994). Another example is Richard Thaler, who contributed
a series of articles to the Journal of Economic Perspectivesmeant to make a case
for insights from behavioral economics, and used Thomas Kuhn’s concept of
anomalies as a general title for the series, but ignored the extensive discussion
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of the concept of anomalies in the methodology literature (e.g., Thaler, 1987).
Indeed, if practitioners are reluctant to make use of the history and methodology
professional literatures, but still wish to use arguments of this character, they
might simply do so in a more implicit manner by adopting and modifying
methodology and history arguments they perceive to be ‘in the air’ according
to their more immediate needs.
A further source of a non-standard methodology and history argumentation
that might emerge in new research programmes would involve researchers
making use of forms of methodological argument specific to the origin fields
from which these new approaches are drawn. Because the content imported
from these fields likely carries with it underlying foundational concerns in
the field from which it is drawn, it is reasonable to expect that economics
researchers who import this content will advance methodological arguments
based on these foundations, particularly where these are in conflict with standard
foundational concerns in economics. For example, the idea of path-dependency,
which underlies reasoning in recent complexity and evolutionary economics,
has origins in history via Paul David and in mathematics via Brian Arthur,
but, because the idea of path-dependency does not sit easily with equilibrium
theorizing, both have made special efforts to explain the concept in terms
of its use in its origin fields (e.g., David, 1985, 1994; Arthur, 1982, 1994).
Thus, non-standard methodology and history argumentation might materialize
in new forms when fields import outside contents. Wade Hands (2001), in fact,
has argued that the sub-field of economic methodology has moved toward
an implicit recognition of this type of development in recent years, in the
process accommodating an infusion of new ideas about methodological thinking
appropriate to economics. Abandoning an earlier strategy of drawing concepts
and principles ‘off the shelf’ of standard scientific philosophy, methodologists
have come increasingly to rely on contemporary science theory to explain
economic reasoning. Contemporary science theory, however, ‘naturalizes’ on
a variety of different science programmes, so that the effect is to incorporate
different foundational themes in recent methodological thinking in a variety of
different ways. How does one go about investigating and documenting this sort
of borrowing process? One way would be to evaluate keyword patterns to track
concepts irrespective of their origins, as has been successfully done by Matthias
Klaes in connection with the concept of transaction cost (Klaes, 2000).
4. Explanations for the change in recent economics
Here I distinguish three leading explanations regarding why neoclassical
economics may be said to have ceased to be the dominant research programme
in contemporary economics: (i) the ‘breakdown’ view, (ii) the ‘outside takeover’
view, and (iii) the ‘maturity’ view. The three explanations are presented
separately simply to distinguish them clearly as different strands in recent
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thinking about the change in economics. But proponents of the general view, that
neoclassicism has ceased to be dominant, often draw upon elements of more than
one explanation, either supposing they work simultaneously or seeing them as
working in succession. The three explanations should all be viewed in the context
of historical influences operating on economics, such as war, depression, changes
in technology, and globalization. These sorts of influences are discussed very little
here as explanations for change in recent economics for two reasons. First, as
typically sustained historical forces, they are generally subtler and less clear in
manifesting their effects on change in economics – a relatively rare exception
being the clear connection between the reception of J. M. Keynes’s work and the
Great Depression. Second, allowing that historical forces do influence change in
thinking in economics, explanations of such change are nonetheless cast primarily
in terms of changes in the content of the field. Thus, while the Great Depression
was an important stimulus to Keynesian macroeconomics, Keynes argued for
his views in terms of what was wrong with the thinking of his predecessors
(Say’s Law type thinking) and in terms of what was right about his (equilibrium
unemployment, effective demand, the role of money, etc.).
The ‘breakdown’ view
The ‘breakdown’ view is that, with the postwar development of axiomatic
general equilibrium theory, neoclassical economics became a highly unified
albeit also flawed conceptual structure possessing inherent barriers to its own
further development that have become increasingly manifest in a number of
important ‘impossibility’ results. Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is both
the first example and the principal source of the idea of neoclassicism as a highly
unified conceptual structure that is the source of its own limitations, in this
instance, in terms of its inability to explain social choice (Arrow, 1963 [1951]).
Amartya Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal theorem subsequently showed
that neoclassicism was inconsistent with the idea of individual liberty (Sen,
1970). The 1960s Cambridge capital controversies then raised the specter that
neoclassicism was internally contradictory with respect to its scarcity rationale in
connection with the concept of aggregate capital (cf. Cohen andHarcourt, 2003).
Finally, The 1970s Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu results – that the arbitrariness
of aggregate excess demands in general equilibrium models ruled out almost all
standard comparative static reasoning in economics – went yet further in saying
that general equilibrium theory was essentially empty of meaningful claims – an
‘Emperor’s clothes’ thesis, as it was put by Alan Kirman, once a strong proponent
of general equilibrium theory (Kirman, 1989; Rizvi, 1994).11
11 ‘[I]f one maintains the fundamentally individualistic approach to constructing economic models,
no amount of attention to the walls will prevent the citadel from being empty. Empty in the sense that
one cannot expect it to house the elements of a scientific theory, one capable of producing empirically
falsifiable propositions’ (Kirman, 1989: 126).
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The ‘breakdown’ view involves the most radical appraisal of neoclassicism,
though it does allow for its continued development, if only in the form of
minor refinements that cordon off the theory’s more fundamental problems.
The implication, however, is that this sort of development is too modest to
sustain the interest of researchers, and/or the sense that the theory is deeply
flawed will ultimately lead researchers, especially younger ones, on to new
theoretical approaches. Left unresolved by most of those who see neoclassicism
as breaking down is whether one should expect the theory to be replaced by
an alternative, still relatively unified conceptual structure that is not flawed,
or whether the idea of a unified conceptual structure is itself flawed, and that
economics might therefore be expected to exhibit a more pluralistic landscape in
the future. Additionally, the former view, which is arguably the majority view,
might come about as a result of either one stronger approach within the array of
new research programmes emerging vis-a`-vis all others or through convergence
of several different approaches on shared assumptions.
The ‘outside takeover’ view
One of the characteristics of neoclassicism at its height was the export of its
concepts and methods of reasoning to non-economic fields. But economics also
has a long history of importing content from other fields (Mirowski, 1989, 2002;
Sent, 1998). There seem to be at least two models for how this might occur. I
have suggested that importing content from other fields is likely to occur when
no one approach is dominant in a field, on the grounds that the absence of
a dominant approach means there is no a clear view in the field as to what
type of content appropriately describes the field. On this view, new approaches
with outside origins compete until one is successful in representing the field. At
that point, the field’s self-conception is re-determined in terms of this successful
approach. But it might alternatively be argued that such imports occur even
when fields have dominant approaches, on the grounds that fields thus organized
have special advantages in integrating non-field content in virtue of their being
relatively well-developed structures. Philip Mirowski makes this argument with
respect to the nineteenth-century emergence of neoclassicism via appropriation
of physics thinking (Mirowski, 1989). Over time, then, an accumulation of such
appropriations could have transformative effects on the dominant approach
and the field. One might, for example, also consider the steady adoption of
mathematical methods in economics as having this sort of effect, and then argue
that a dominant neoclassicism gradually evolved into contemporary formalist,
mainstream economics by way of this kind of process, as does Mark Blaug with
respect to the rise of postwar neoclassical formalism (cf. Blaug, 2003).
Whether one employs one model or the two in combination, however, the
general view here is that all fields are in a state of continual transformation,
sometimes in a gradually and almost imperceptible manner or sometimes more
dramatically and convulsively. Essentially fields possess an at best transitory
16 JOHN B. DAVIS
stability in terms of their content and scope, and the very concept of a field is at
bottom artificial and arbitrary. From this perspective, the idea of a field having
cycles of dominance and pluralism is also suspect or short-term in focus, since
this would assume some long-term stability in the idea of a field. Taken to its
extreme or in the long-term, fields might even disappear altogether over time as
entirely different organizations of their contents, together with the addition of
contents not traditionally associated with those fields, come about.
The ‘maturity’ view
This view might be thought a variant of the ‘breakdown’ view minus that view’s
claims about the problematic character of neoclassicism. The essential idea here
is that, since any given approach involves a relatively set conceptual apparatus,
any approach can explain only so many phenomena. Then, once an approach
has been fully developed and applied to all the phenomena it might explain, it
is ‘mature’ in the sense of having completed its full range of possible tasks. Any
given approach thus undergoes a development process that must ultimately come
to a natural conclusion, after which researchers turn to new approaches. David
Colander has argued this has been the case with neoclassicism (Colander, 2000,
2001). Emphasizing the role of the research frontier, he sees mature research
programmes as offering declining opportunities to new researchers, and suggests
that doctoral supervisors, who have a clear view of what remains to be done in a
given research programme, attract and direct new researchers toward issues that
fall either on or outside the boundaries of the programme (Colander, 2001). He
reinforces this argument with an emphasis on the changing role of technology.
Computing technology has clearly advanced significantly in recent decades, and
this has both allowed previously intractable problems within the neoclassical
research programme to be addressed and eliminated as outstanding issues, and
has also created new horizons for economics that go beyond the neoclassical
programme.
Neoclassicism, then, is not so much a failed programme as a finished one.
This is not to imply that a finished programme is without its limitations. Rather
the general idea is that the programme works reasonably well within its defined
scope, and, where it does face limitations, these do not threaten the integrity
of the programme per se. That is, the motive for abandoning a programme
at the field’s research frontier is not any fundamental disenchantment with it,
but rather awareness that more rapid development of economics is available in
newer programmes in earlier stages of development. Strictly speaking, then, the
neoclassical programme will never be abandoned altogether, even were research
to be concentrated increasingly on other research approaches. Since, within its
scope, neoclassicism is regarded as reasonably successful, applied research that
does not seek to extend the basic framework can continue indefinitely with
ever-new applications. This is arguably reflected in the wide use of standard
microeconomic models in a variety of policy contexts. Thus, unlike the other
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two views, the ‘maturity’ view allows for a sustainable if no longer dominant
neoclassicism; though, of course, it is also conceivable that even a relatively
secure but no longer dominant view could later be seen as offering diminishing
returns.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether neoclassical economics might be in the process
of being replaced by a collection of new competing research programmes, and
thus whether neoclassical dominance is being replaced by a new mainstream
pluralism. In an effort to produce an historical–methodological examination of
the issue, the paper emphasized the importance of economics instruction and
economics research as two key practices central to the replication of economics
as a field, and hypothesized, first, that the direction of causation for change in
economics is from research to instruction, and, second, that research changes
on a continually moving research frontier. These two hypotheses enable us to
say that the non-neoclassical development at the economics research frontier
provides evidence that neoclassical dominance of economics is being supplanted
by a new mainstream pluralism.
The more systematic, historical–methodological part of the paper involves an
export/import model across field boundaries, combined with a characterization
of economics’ self-appraisal process in terms of economic methodology and
history of economics. The export/import model is used to propose a (non-regular)
cycle hypothesis of alternating unity and plurality in the history of economics.
On this hypothesis, neoclassical dominance has likely been supplanted by a
mainstream pluralism, because the new research programmes in economics
all have imported content from outside fields with different, non-economic
foundations so as to produce a juxtaposition of differently based approaches
within economics. In regard to the self-appraisal process in economics, the
paper hypothesized that methodology and history of economics are in retreat
in periods when the field is dominated by one approach, but regain importance,
if not always in the traditional form, in periods of pluralism. On this hypothesis
as well, neoclassical dominance has likely been supplanted by a mainstream
pluralism, because, in contrast to neoclassical economists, contributors to the
new research programmes in economics have shown an interest in making
use of methodology and history arguments to justify their departures from
neoclassicism, and differentiate their approaches from each other. The paper
concludes with brief review of three leading explanations of why neoclassicism
seems to have been supplanted by a new mainstream pluralism.
In closing, I comment briefly on whether a new mainstream pluralism
might ultimately converge upon a single, new dominant research programme
that draws from the existing new research programmes in economics and
perhaps neoclassicism. As noted above, there is already a new wave of doctoral
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research that combines game theory, experiment, and behavioral assumptions.
On the analysis here, then, convergence could come about were the different
foundational elements from each of the new research programmes to lose
their primary association with their origins outside of economics, and rather
be increasingly associated with ‘economics’. As suggested at the outset, this
may have significant implications for evolutionary and institutional themes in
economics, which have been primarily associated with heterodox economics in
the period of neoclassical dominance. That is, since heterodox economics has
also been to some extent ‘outside’ economics in a manner not entirely unlike
other science fields, as imports from these outside fields increasingly influence
economics, it is reasonable that themes and concepts from heterodox economics
will also be appropriated by the mainstream where there is overlap and
shared concerns over borrowed contents. Indeed, if we characterize heterodox
economics loosely as an economics with particular attachments to the kinds of
investigations carried on in other science fields, the appropriation of contents
from those other science fields also constitutes an appropriation of heterodox
economics themes and concepts. Casual evidence for this conclusion was cited
in the introduction to the paper, further attention to which, it thus seems, is
certainly deserving of further research. Thus a possible convergence toward a
new dominant approach in economics that assembles conceptual materials from
different locations need not necessarily replicate the orthodox/heterodox divide
characteristic of the period of neoclassical dominance.
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